Many of my own philosophical questions revolve around the idea of self. Who am I? Why am I here? How can I know myself? Is my self real? We find examples of philosophers discussing these questions throughout history. Attempting to identify the self as something one can know while encountering all the ancillary ideas that each position leads to has been a subject of much discussion. Rene Descartes found himself in an uncomfortable situation trying to satisfy the inclinations of both his religious and scientific mind. He found his answer in an ontological dualism that put res cogitans, the thinking, unextended substance under the authority of God (and thus, the Church), and res extensa, the unthinking, extended substance under the authority of science. In this way, Descartes reasoned, both empirical and rational truths can coexist. However, this idea quickly came under scrutiny as it seemed to make a causal connection between the mind or soul, and the body or physical nature impossible (Mitchell on Descartes’ Epistemology, 236).
While Descartes tried to produce solutions, as he was certain the mind and the body were linked, he was unable to do so convincingly; his best effort was the pineal gland (Mitchell on Descartes’ Epistemology, 237). Both Physicalists, who identify self as the body only, and Idealists, who argue the self is only an idea, use the mind body problem to refute the dualism defended by Descartes. In fact, David Hume uses the argument as part of his discussion to conclude that there is no actual “self” at all. While I think it is safe to say that the pineal gland is not the linchpin of the mind and body, I also think that, barring a reality I cannot conceive of, denying any idea of self is also inadequate. I am in good company in that idea as Immanuel Kant also disagreed with Hume’s evaluation of self. Instead Kant imagined that there are two separate realities – the noumena that we cannot know, and the phenomena that we can. Kant uses the concept of transcendental ideas to explain how the information passes or shifts from the noumena to the phenomena (Soccio on Kant, 318). It is in these shifts that we develop constructs for our reality. As these transcendental ideas are ignited by experience, forming structures for the experiencer through which the noumena become organized into the phenomena, it is a likely candidate for the mind body connection and satisfactory criteria for personal identity. This idea of construct of self through a perception of experience gained momentum through my encounter with William James’ discussion on consciousness (although I do not pretend to understand the fullness of that piece of work), and solidified with V.F. Cordova’s assertion that self is a constant creation.
If I may be permitted a caveat: I have been somewhat hesitant to tackle this subject, partly because it covers multiple philosophers. Mostly because, as I have intimated, I am honest about my lack of full understanding of the philosophic positions offered. However, I have decided to take the journey approach to explain my position. As such, I will begin with my first encounter with the idea of self and move through to the most comfortable idea I believe I have ever heard concerning the subject. The errors in understanding are all mine. However, the knowledge gained is valuable to me even in its imperfection.
My idea of self moved from a casual and obvious fact to a philosophical quest with Descartes’ Cogito. While familiar with “I think therefore I am,” this condensed version had not inspired a contemplation of self. However, the expanded idea, in particular “…he can never make me be nothing as long as I think that I am something,” resonated in such a way that, while I could not be sure exactly how I would get there, I was certain that I agreed philosophically with the existence of a self (Mitchell on Descartes’ Epistemology, 232).
Because I am unfamiliar with all the rules of philosophy, I am only partly sure that my certainty of destination breaks one of them. That concern only lasted for a moment as Descartes’ offering of the pineal glad and Cartesian circle offering to solve the mind body problem was immediately met by an eyeroll at the absurdity. Hence, I was certain I had my intellectual honesty intact even if I had violated a predestination in research rule (again if there is such a rule). This intellectual honesty had me at a serious disadvantage when I engaged with David Hume who argued against the existence of a self at all. Because of our current inability to scientifically show where the self is, or to define the material of which it is made, there is no way to prove its physicality or permanence. Therefore, it does not exist; there is no self (Pojman on Personal Identity in Locke and Hume, 384). While his argument was compelling, it was not insurmountable. First, Hume’s asserted that every real thing must correspond to one real idea (Pojman on Personal Identity in Locke and Hume, 384). The self does not have any singular impression and is therefore not real. I refute this point with one simple question, “Why must it?” While I am sure Hume has a compelling answer for that, I will continue to go back to “…he can never make me be nothing as long as I think that I am something.” In this particular instance, Hume, not Descartes’ evil deity, is the “he.”
While I would have resigned myself to this idea to preserve my belief of a self, Immanuel Kant did not let me fight this good fight alone for very long. His Copernican revolution changed the way in which experiential knowledge and personal ideas of such knowledge could be deemed as true. Kant suggested that the mind did not conform to experience, but that experience conformed to the mind. Kant suggested that there were two types of reality – noumenal reality and phenomenal reality. Our experience is facilitated by transcendental ideas. These ideas, Kant suggests, are the way in which experience, the noumena that we cannot know is conformed into the phenomena that we can know (Soccio on Kant, 318). In this singular reversal, Kant provided me with a counterpoint to Hume’s suggestion that self was nothing more than a bundle of perceptions. My self, my cogito, is the is the creator of the perceptions. Without my self, there are no perceptions. As Hume has acknowledged the existence of perceptions, in fact bundles of them, I would insist that he therefore acknowledge my self as the facilitator of those perceptions. is Coperiam Hois
William James furthers my journey, although in a cursory way. While I understand many of his thoughts, I am having a much tougher time determining his point. His tone suggests that he is directly contradicting Kant’s thoughts on transcendental ideas and sides with Hume on the denial of the existence of self, positioning the self as a “function” versus something real (James – Does Consciousness Exist, 3 – 4). However, I will share how his ideas of experience and his metaphor of both the paint and the room set me up for the apex encounter with Cordova and my final argument that my self does exist and it is real in so far as I identify and understand real. James’ proposal that “things,” e.g., the paint and the room, are real both of themselves and within the context of the being experiencing them situates itself, in my mind, in line with Kant’s description of noumena and phenomena. The paint, the room (noumena) cannot be known by my self outside of the transcendental ideas that shape it into the phenomena. Once I have experienced the paint, the room, there is both the paint, the room as they are and my perception of them in my self. The differences between the actuality of the paint, the room and my perceptions of them may be nonexistent or innumerable; they still exist both in themselves and in my self. James describes this ability to exist in multiplicity as the way a point can exist on two separate lines provided that the lines intersect. To this point, I would suggest that one line being the paint’s, the room’s existence, and the other being my self. Without my self, there is no intersection. Regardless of whether one positions the experience within or without, or considers it by addition or subtraction, and regardless of how many instances of the paint, the room exist based on encounters, if they are able exist outside of themselves at all relies on the existence of my self to interact with it.
This journey explains why my mind was ready with full preparation to encounter V. F. Cordova. Allow me to venture into the illustrative for a moment and I will conclude with reasoned logic, thus covering, I hope, both the relative and absolute belief I have in my self, and the self of others. I found Cordova’s writing to be beautiful and profound. Her respect of nature and our place in it was complete, whether we as individuals respected it or not. Her ability to confront the human condition as a whole, in parts, relative, and separate had the ability to convey both empathy and straight forward judgements. In her explanation of our relationship to nature, our egg in the womb reliance to that which is around us, I found the final piece, for now, that I needed to put my belief that my existence is real, my self is my existence, therefore my self is real.